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This paper investigates the determinants of the arbitration taking place after a corporate default. Two ways of 
resolving financial distress are conceivable: either the creditors privately renegotiate with the debtor, or a formal 
bankruptcy procedure is triggered. This arbitration depends on the legal context and, more specifically, on the 
national bankruptcy code. We use original data coming from the recovery units of five French commercial banks. 
Our sample gathers 735 credit lines allocated to 386 distressed companies 
We test four hypotheses. Hypothesis H1 proposes that bargaining power imbalances may have more impact on the 
arbitration than simple coordination failures, especially under court-administered legislations.  Hypothesis H2 
suggests that, to initiate the process of renegotiation, a bank needs information on the project’s profitability and on 
the managers’ reliability. To reach an agreement, the bank must ensure that both the conditions have been met. 
Hypothesis H3  predicts  that  the likelihood of renegotiation increases with the bank’s financial involvement. 
Hypothesis H4 focuses on the level of collateralization: when the bank has inclination for liquidation, collaterals may 
increase the occurrence of bankruptcy, provided the law facilitates such liquidation and preserves the bank’s priority. 
For testing the hypotheses H1 to H4, we use sequential LOGIT modeling to split between the variables explaining 
the decision to engage (or not) renegotiation and the variables explaining the success (or the failure) of renegotiation. 
Regarding H1, we find that even a court-administered procedure may not be dissuasive provided that the bank’s 
bargaining power is strong enough. Regarding H2, we show that the profitability of the project and the reliability of 
the managers are two essential conditions for avoiding bankruptcy, and it takes some time to discover them. 
Regarding H3, our estimates show that, when the lending is bigger and/or when the debt contract is longer, then the 
chances of renegotiation are higher, but this does not predict such renegotiation shall be successful. Last, regarding 
H4, we do not find any evidence that the level of collateralization influences the arbitration between renegotiation 
and bankruptcy. 
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Introduction 
 
Previous works of La Porta et al (1997) (1998) established the fact that bankruptcy procedures 
vary from one country to the other. These differences are likely to impact the default process that 
precedes bankruptcy. Default (or, equivalently financial distress) can be viewed as a double-step 
mechanism: first, the firm  does not repay (or delays the repayments), and, second, the 
stakeholders trigger formal bankruptcy if they cannot (or do not wish to) privately renegotiate. 
As  demonstrated earlier  by Haugen and Senbet (1978) (1988),  a  default can be  resolved 
privately, because informal renegotiation between the debtor and its creditor(s) is a convenient 
way of saving bankruptcy costs. Such an internalization process is derived from the well-known 
Coasian approach of disputes. In their view, the parties should embrace the most cost effective 
way of resolving default,  thereby avoiding any unnecessary bankruptcy costs. However, the 
increasing number of bankruptcy procedures all over Europe shows that internalizing bankruptcy 
costs through negotiation is not always feasible. So those conditions need to be studied further 
under which the creditors and the debtors fail to renegotiate with each other and may finally 
resort to costlier ways of resolving default. Recent works suggest that the tradeoff between the 
private and the court solutions is not a straightforward process and depends on a set of variables 
that go beyond simple cost-benefit arbitration. These variables are numerous: they encompass 
the common pool problem, the nature of the banking relationship, the national specificities of the 
bankruptcy law, the asymmetries of information, the  debt contract  design, (etc.). All are 
determinants of the way default is, or should be, resolved. 
Several authors have studied the variables that influence the strategies of creditors and debtors 
evolving just after default. Two such recent studies were conducted in United Kingdom (Franks 
and Sussman (2005)) and Germany (Jostarndt and Sautner (2010)). Their studies cover two of the 
most important European legal systems: the Common Law and the German Civil Law. Both 
systems radically differ from each other, especially regarding the way the bankruptcy codes are 
designed. Surprisingly enough, no study has been performed, until now, on the French Civil Law. 
Yet, this legal system has inspired other important legislations in continental Europe such as in 
Belgium or in Luxembourg (a country which has demonstrated its capacity of attracting most of 
the European Investment funds owing to its attractive legal environment including bankruptcy 
law). From this perspective, until now, academic research has offered an incomplete view of the 
post-default arbitrages that practically prevail in contemporary Europe.   3
Our research contributes deeper insights into the process of post-default arbitrage by analyzing 
original and unique data coming from five major French commercial banks located in Paris, 
Nanterre, Reims, and Marseilles. Under the supervision of Standard & Poor’s Risk Solution
4, the 
data was manually collected from these banks’ recovery units: the sample gathers 735 credit lines 
allocated to 386 distressed companies ( 233 of them are used in our econometric regressions). 
Following the Basel II criteria, we consider a firm defaults as soon as the repayment is delayed 
by 90 days. Our variables consist of, first, the profile of the company (age, sector, group, legal 
form, size – number of employees, turnover, and total of assets), second, the origin(s) of the 
default (with a specific focus on faulty management), third, the nature of the credit relationship 
(length, creditors’ concentration, rating), fourth, the type of borrowings (each credit line is 
aggregated for every debtor: collateralization, duration, authorized amount, recovery rate). 
Understanding the post-default arbitration between the private and the court solutions is quite a 
complex task.  We test four hypotheses  in this article. The first hypothesis (H1) accounts for 
coordination and bargaining issues: precisely, we suggest there may be a tradeoff between the 
arguments based on coordination issues and the counterarguments based on the stakeholders’ 
bargaining power. Such tradeoff  is not  independent from the legal environment. We suggest 
bargaining power imbalances may have more impact on the arbitration than simple coordination 
failures, especially under court-administered legislations, as in France. The second hypothesis 
(H2)  highlights a  tradeoff  based on the bank’s information:  to initiate the process of 
renegotiation, a bank needs information about the profitability of the project (adverse selection) 
and the reliability of the managers (moral hazard). To reach an agreement the bank must ensure 
that both the conditions are likely to be met. The third hypothesis (H3) suggests the likelihood of 
renegotiation (or at least an attempt to renegotiate)  increases with  the  bank’s  financial 
involvement (high authorized amount and/or  old banking relationship). The fourth hypothesis 
(H4) predicts that the level of collateralization should increase the occurrence of bankruptcy, 
provided, first, the bank prefers liquidation and the law facilitates such liquidation, second, the 
renegotiation process cannot fully replicate the legal absolute priority order, and third, the 
bankruptcy procedure does not decrease the bank’s priority over junior claims. In France, these 
                                                    
4 This database is the French part of a wider database (France, United-Kingdom, and Germany) that was studied by 
Davydenko and Franks (2008).   4
conditions are partially invalidated as  liquidation is viewed as a secondary objective, and the 
social claims outrank the secured ones. 
Contrary to the previous works, which considered default resolution as a static process (simple 
LOGIT or simple PROBIT approaches), we model the arbitration between the private and the 
legal solutions as a dynamic process which consists of the following steps: 
¦   First step: the creditor and/or the debtor arbitrate between going directly to bankruptcy 
and trying to renegotiate. 
¦   Second step: Based on the fact that renegotiation was opted for in the first step, debtors 
and creditors are left with two options: to opt for an informal workout (private agreement) 
or adopt a formal bankruptcy procedure. 
Following  that perspective, we run a sequential LOGIT model (Tutz (1991)) that explicitly 
considers two transitional steps:  a separate LOGIT regression is run for each transition (Buis 
(2007) (2008)). The first transition consists of an alternative between “direct bankruptcy” and 
“renegotiation attempt”. The second transition consists of an alternative between “failed 
renegotiation” (hence, bankruptcy) and “successful renegotiation” (hence, private agreement) for 
those cases that have selected the alternative “renegotiation attempt” during the first transition. 
The article is organized as follows: section 1 presents the theoretical arguments that are debated 
in the literature. Section 2 proposes a set of four hypotheses on  the arbitration’s motives. 
Section 3 presents the sample,  the data, and  the  descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses our 
hypotheses based on the results of the sequential LOGIT model. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
Section 1. The theoretical arguments 
 
The default stems from the debtor inability to respect the current charges deriving from previous 
commitments. In a practical view, and following the Basel II criteria, a company “defaults” as 
soon as the repayment schedule is delayed for more than 90 days. Such default may destroy trust 
that had been established with the financiers, and consequently, put at risk the future debtor’s 
investment opportunities, as trust is the angular stone of any contractual relationship. From that 
perspective, depending on the future prospects, the resolution of default should facilitate either 
the debtor’s reorganization or the debtor’s termination. An efficient way to resolve financial 
distress should facilitate reorganization (respectively liquidation) when the debtor’s continuation 
value is more (resp. less) than the liquidation value. Yet, such arbitration strongly depends on the   5
way the default resolution is done: default can be resolved in two alternative ways, either by 
exploring informal solutions (private agreement), or by delegating this work to a Court (formal 
bankruptcy).  A set of traditional arguments and counterarguments have been proposed by the 
literature to describe the pros and the cons of both ways of resolving default. On the one hand, 
informal agreements are relatively fast, cheap and preserve confidentiality while, on the other 
hand, formal bankruptcy procedures can solve coordination issues, disclose public information, 
and preserve the debtor’s value. These arguments are described in more detail below. 
 
The arbitration between private agreement and formal bankruptcy is directly related to the 
Coasian approach of litigation. Haugen and Senbet (1978) (1988) study the various ways to 
restructure the debt efficiently in a market solution so that the litigation costs accruing from 
formal processes can be avoided. Roe (1983) also presented similar arguments. The informal 
workouts are considered to be less costly than the formal resolution procedures. Indeed, formal 
procedures involve direct (accruing out of the legal process for instance legal fees) and indirect 
costs (arising out of foregone investment opportunities, loss of sale) which eventually have to be 
borne by the already distressed company and thus can shrink the overall recoveries. 
Consequently, the creditors should always choose a method which increases their recoveries at 
the minimum cost  (Gilson (1997), Gilson  et al. (1990), Wruck (1990)). Following similar 
arguments, Jensen (1989) (1991) states that if the private workouts are more cost efficient than 
formal process, it always pays to choose them. To measure the direct costs of informal workouts 
is difficult as this process is carried with confidentiality. However, some researchers have been 
able to document these costs for the restructuring of public debt via a formal exchange offer. 
Gilson, John and Lang (1990) examine the exchange cost for 18 offers which averaged at 0.6 % 
of the book value of assets. Betkar (1997) demonstrates that for 29 exchange offers, a cost with a 
mean of 2.5% of pre-exchanged assets (median 2%) was incurred. It has been also found that out 
of court restructurings are faster than the judicial process like Chapter 11. 
However, the arbitration between the informal and formal ways of resolving default cannot be 
reduced to a simple cost comparison. The literature has provided additional arguments in favor of 
the private solution. These are mainly related to confidentiality and control.  First, w orkouts 
preserve the confidentiality of the financial distress surrounding the company, keep the creditors’ 
confidence alive, and also prevent bad reputation effects. Preserving confidentiality is likely to   6
generate value: focusing on the U.S. case, Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez (1995) show less 
negative abnormal returns for announcement of workout than Chapter 11 filings. Gilson, John, 
and Lang (1990) further add that stocks returns are more negative for firms that subsequently file 
for Chapter 11. Second, workouts  may be preferred over bankruptcy  because they avoid the 
conflicts that may arise between the legal representatives and the company’s agents, as often the 
latter lose control in hands of legal administrator (Franks and Nyborg (1996)). 
 
Overall, the approach initiated by Haugen and Senbet (1978) (1988) systematically favoring the 
market solution and providing different manners to carry it out efficiently, questions the very 
existence of collective procedures in bankruptcy. It is thus necessary to have an insight on some 
impediments that might deter this approach. Indeed, despites the advantages of the private 
solution, recent empirical studies have found a decline in the number of firms restructuring out of 
court. The reason could be that a large proportion of firms fail to successfully renegotiate out of 
court. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) examine 169 financially distress firms, out of these 53 
percent (89 firms) fail to restructure privately. Franks and Torous ( 1994) find the similar 
proportions of firms failing to restructure privately. Jensen (1991) explains the reason for the 
decline of private workouts relative to formal procedures. He draws attention towards legal ruling 
that discourage workouts. The example of LTV Corp. bankruptcy case, where the court held that 
the debtholders who participated initially in out of court restructurings, could only claim for the 
new reduced principal amount whereas holdout claimants received the original amount of money. 
The decision had a severe impact on the creditors who were now apprehensive of out of court 
restructurings. 
 
Thus, in particular cases, collective procedures may be most effective way to resolve financial 
distress. The most quoted reasons are related to the failure of renegotiation: lack of coordination, 
contract incompleteness, and asymmetries of information. Some additional reasons are related to 
the nature of the banking relationship and to the structure of the debtor’s balance sheet. 
 
We consider the obstacles to private renegotiation. The first one is about the coordination issues 
that may arise when the number of creditors increases (Franks and Torous (1991), Gertner and 
Scharfstein (1991), Roe (1987)). Firstly, each creditor has the incentive to individually enforce 
liquidation in order to guarantee full recovery: Baird (1986) predicts such “common pool   7
problem” results in an anarchic creditors’ race that finally reduces the debtor’s value. By freezing 
the  payments and suspending the creditor’s rights (stay of claims), bankruptcy procedures 
provide some time for fixing the liability and maintenance of the assets of the debtor and the 
search for potential buyers. As a consequence, turning to bankruptcy may resolve the common 
pool problem. Secondly, some creditors having low priority as compared to others may block 
negotiation in the hope of getting better recovery in the formal procedure (Grossman and Hart 
(1981)). Such “free riding problem” may be reduced if the bankruptcy law allows for deviations 
from the  absolute priority order  of repayments (Blazy and Chopard (2004)). Naturally, such 
deviations may be also internalized via renegotiation (Frierman and Viswanath (1994))
5. 
 
The second obstacle to private renegotiation stems from contract incompleteness and from 
asymmetries of information. Firstly,  the debt contracts specify how  the terms and conditions 
should be carried out incase of default, and how the proceeds should be distributed and realized. 
These contracts by nature are incomplete. For instance the contracts contingent on cash flows are 
difficult to enforce as their value keeps on changing and is difficult to assess for outsiders and 
court. The managers can take advantage of his position to divert these cash flows according to 
their own will and personal incentives. Secondly, it  would be  possible to  renegotiate debt 
informally if the market was perfect and the information available to parties was symmetrical. 
Webb (1987) and Brown (1989) confirm the supremacy of informal process in the presence of 
symmetric information.  In practice however, insiders (the debtors)  may benefit from better 
information than the outsiders (the creditors). Insiders have better knowledge about the assets and 
liabilities of the company, ongoing firm value and liquidation value. T hey can use this 
information to their advantage. Giammarino (1989) and Mooradian (1994) proclaim that creditors 
might choose to go for costly bankruptcy procedure if they observe asymmetries of information 
and lack of trust for the insiders. In the same perspective, Carepeto (2005) asserts that presence of 
information asymmetry can lead to extended bargaining, requiring several plans before any 
agreement could be reached. The existence of uncertainty of credible information on the part of 
creditor’s urge them to opt for costly bankruptcy procedure, so that true picture of company and 
its business can be made available to them without them being tricked by the insiders. 
                                                    
5 Weiss (1990) shows that in a small sample of 37 U.S. companies, 29 cases were distinguished by violations of 
priority, the latter occurring mainly among the unsecured creditors and shareholders (the rights of secured creditors 
being more frequently observed). Similarly, Franks and Torous (1989) (1991) confirm the importance of violations 
of absolute priority in the context of the renegotiations with private partners.   8
Additionally, several other reasons explain the occurrence of costly bankruptcy procedures. 
These reasons are attached to the nature of the banking relationship and to the structure of the 
debtor’s balance sheet.  They reflect on the one hand, the debtor’s constrained financing 
decisions, and on the other hand, the debtor’s investing opportunities. Regarding the former 
argument,  Gilson, John and Lang (1990) show  that there are  more chances of private 
renegotiation if the firm has close relationship with the bank and reduced pool of banks as 
creditors. Similar results were found by Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) in their study about 
Japanese industrial firms that had privileged relationship with the bank and hence enjoyed the 
ease of private renegotiation. Regarding the structure of the balance sheet (assets side), Gilson, 
John, and Lang (1990) find that the firms having greater proportion of intangible assets in their 
asset structure, would prefer to go for private workouts as the chances of decline in their value is 
maximum in bankruptcy process. On the liabilities side, Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez (1995) 
show the choice of restructuring out of court depend on the firm’s level of debt, its short term 
liquidity, and chances of coordination problems arising among the creditors. In the same view, 
Gilson John, and Lang (1990) suggest the presence of fewer categories of debts (out of which a 
higher proportion belonging to long term debts mainly accruing from banks) can help to resolve 
problems related to conflicts of interests: less number of distinct debts means more manageable is 
the private workout. Moreover, banks in comparison to common debts (trade debts or public 
debts) are better informed as such they can play a pivotal role in restructuring and in internalizing 
some of the restructuring costs
6. James (1995) and Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) 
symmetrically find the presence of public debts may hinder the process of private renegotiation. 
 
As shown before, the literature provides different arguments showing, first, the  arbitration 
between private  renegotiation and  costly  bankruptcy i s not neutral, and second,  the former 
solution is not always superior to the latter. As shown before, the literature has raised several 
motives that drive such arbitration (impediments to coordination, informational structure, shape 
of the debt contracts, nature of the assets, etc). In the next section, we consider more recent 
empirical findings and gather the motives of the arbitration in a set of four hypotheses that we 
aim to test empirically. 
                                                    
6 Franks and Torous (1994) find the firms  opting for private workouts are more solvent and liquid having less 
negative stock returns just prior to the negotiation process. They however, did not find greater proportion of bank 
debt in the firms. The reason could be the firms are large and have large number of banks as debtors.   9
Section 2. The hypotheses on the arbitration’s motives 
 
This section gathers the previous theoretical arguments and  considers more recent empirical 
findings in order to propose four hypotheses (H1 to H4) on the motives that are expected to drive 
the arbitration between private renegotiation and formal bankruptcy. Each developped hypothesis 
does not lead to a definitive prediction, of course, but rather highlight a balance between the main 
variables that may influence the way of resolving default. Hypothesis H1 focuses on the number 
of creditors, and suggests a balance between coordination and arbitration issues. We show that 
such a balance directly stems from the legal environment of bankruptcy. The second hypothesis 
focuses on the  bank’s information relative to the debtor’s quality, which depends on the 
profitability of the project (H2a) and on the manager’s honesty and competency (H2b). Both 
elements are essential to make the renegotiation process successful (in the perspective of an 
extension of the banking relationship). Hypothesis H3 focuses on the debt contract design. Such 
contract is multidimensional and covers (among other factors) the maximum authorized amount, 
the required collaterals, and the length of the lending relationship. Last, hypothesis H4 focuses on 
the structure of the debt, i.e. the legal protection of the creditors, which directly stems from the 
absolute priority rule prevailing under bankruptcy. 
 
2.1. Hypothesis H1: coordination vs. bargaining power 
 
The most common view is formal bankruptcy can solve coordination problems arising during 
renegotiation. This argumentation was developed in numerous papers and relies on the simple 
idea that finding an agreement leading to reorganization is more complex to attain when creditor 
with conflicting interests are numerous. For instance, under specific circumstances (detailed by 
Blazy and Chopard (2010)), secured creditors are inclined to prevent the debtor to reorganize, 
contrary to unsecured creditors (Bergström et al. (2002), Morrison (2007)). In fact, even creditors 
having the same rank in the APO may face coordination issues, when they compete together 
while the aggregated value of their claim exceeds the residual value of the debtor’s assets. 
Thus, a private agreement is all the more difficult to reach when the number of creditors is high. 
The lack of coordination increases even more when the creditors have different rankings in the 
APO. Contrary to the private solution, bankruptcy procedures provide legal mechanisms that help 
the creditors to coordinate. Depending on the code, such mechanisms rely on vote procedures   10
(United-Kingdom, Germany, France since 2005, Chapter11 in the U.S.) or on the discretionary 
decision of a judge (France before 2005). In addition, in most countries, the “stay of claims” and 
the  legal obligation to  appoint  a creditors’ representative  are measures that  both  help in 
increasing coordination. 
 
Thus,  following  the “ coordination” argument, the probability of triggering bankruptcy  should 
increase with the number of creditors. Yet, recent works provide counterarguments suggesting 
the  relation may be reversed due to  imbalances in the respective  bargaining  powers of the 
creditor(s) and  of  the debtor (“bargaining power” counterargument). We detail below  these 
counterarguments  predicting  a negative relation between the number of creditors  and the 
probability of triggering bankruptcy. 
 
A first explanation is raised by Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2009) in their empirical work on 
Belgium. The authors consider a debtor as having one sole creditor (a bank). Two mechanisms 
arise from this situation: (1) the bank does not have to compete with other potential creditors 
under bankruptcy, so that private renegotiation and formal bankruptcy present similar advantages 
(coordination is not an issue anymore), and (2), as quoted by the authors: “the bank may be less 
supportive (…) if the chances that substantial value may be lost in the future are high. In the 
practice, reorganization is unfeasible without bank support”. Let us transpose this argument to 
the arbitration between renegotiation and bankruptcy. Suppose first, the decision to liquidate or to 
reorganize under bankruptcy relies in the hands of a court (as in France) and second, the debtor’s 
main bank has some preference for liquidation. As the debtor cannot survive without the bank’s 
support, the bank has no fear to enter bankruptcy, as it anticipates the court will have no other 
choice than liquidating (there is no risk that another creditor provides the needed funds to finance 
continuation). Here, as the bank is the main creditor, (1) there is low risk of sharing repayments 
under bankruptcy, and (2) the bank reasonably anticipates liquidation, as continuation is unlikely 
to be decided without its financial support. 
Another counterargument would be worth mentioning even though it might be weaker than the 
first one. Suppose the chances of recovery of a distressed company depend on one sole creditor’s 
willingness to renew the loan. The bargaining power of the main creditor  is  relatively  high 
compared to the debtor’s one: the creditor may ask for (too) high renegotiation amounts, so that   11
the debtor as no choice other than turning to bankruptcy. This is all the more likely to happen 
when the bankruptcy code is debtor friendly (as in France). Of course, one can object that such 
unbalanced situations (in terms of bargaining powers) can always be internalized through 
renegotiation. This is true, but, bankruptcy may not be avoided  anyway  if the creditor 
(respectively the debtor) overestimates (resp. underestimates)  its bargaining power during the 
renegotiation process. 
To sum up, hypothesis H1 shows  that the impact of the creditors’ dispersion on the way of 
resolving default is  complex:  obviously,  there is a balance between the arguments based on 
coordination and the counterarguments based on the stakeholders’ respective bargaining power. 
As suggested above, such balance may not be independent from the legal context. We predict the 
latter arguments may over-compensate the former ones if the legislation is debtor friendly and 
gives the decision power to a court, as it was the case in France until the French reform in 2005. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis H2: sequential information gathering 
 
Most theoretical works in banking economics rely on the assumption that the banks are under-
informed. Such situation generates serious issues related to adverse selection and to moral hazard. 
Adverse selection stems from the bank’s inability to observe the quality of the project to be 
financed: most of the time, “ high-quality”  means a safer project and/or a higher expected 
profitability.  When  information is asymmetric, “high quality”  borrowers have incentives to 
provide information to the bank using a reliable signal (i.e. a signal that can not be provided by 
“low-quality” borrowers). Collaterals are such a signal, as they are more costly for “low-quality” 
borrowers having a higher risk of  default and hence the risk of losing their collateral (Bester 
(1985), Besanko and Thakor ( 1987)). Consequently, collaterals act as signaling devices 
conveying valuable information to the bank. Moral Hazard is associated to the debtor’s strategic 
opportunism. Namely, once the funds are granted to the company, the debtor may not provide the 
optimal level of effort or switch to riskier investments. Again the bank can align the borrower’s 
interest with its own, using collaterals, as it imposes a greater loss on the borrower in case of 
financial distress. It is all the more true in the case of outside collaterals that extend limited 
liability to some external assets (Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991), Hainz (2003)). 
Yet, one may not follow the argument stating the banks are under-informed. According to Berger 
and Udell (1990) and Jimenez and Saurina (2004), the banks have sufficient information to sort   12
adequately their borrowers (financial reports, movements on the bank account, random audits…). 
Practically, credit scoring is a powerful tool that helps the bank to screen the debtors and to 
assess their probability of default (provided the macroeconomic environment does not change too 
much). This argument is known as the “risk-observed” hypothesis. 
To summarize, hypothesis H2 highlights a balance relying on the quality of the bank’s 
information: is the bank well-informed on the debtor’s project? The probability a bank can reach 
an agreement with its debtor mechanically depends on the quality of such information.  More 
precisely, to support renegotiation, a bank needs to get informed on (1) the profitability of the 
project that was financed before default (adverse selection issue), and on (2) the reliability of the 
managers to run a reorganization (moral hazard issue). To be executable, the private agreement 
requires the bank has strong beliefs that both conditions are met. In other terms, a bank accepts to 
renegotiate provided, first, the firm’s project is profitable in the long run (hypothesis H2a), and, 
second, the managers are honest and competent (hypothesis H2b). Without both elements, there 
is no room for supporting reorganization through renegotiation, so that liquidation through 
bankruptcy is preferable (keeping in mind the previous works of Blazy, Delannay, Petey and 
Weill (2008), which pointed out that most bankruptcy procedures lead to liquidation in Europe). 
To test hypothesis H2a, one needs information either on the forecast accounts, or on the debtor’s 
individual ratings. Both sources of information provide useful elements to assess the expected 
profitability of the project to restructure. Testing for hypothesis H2b is trickier as the assessment 
of the managers’ reliability is more subjective. At least, one needs reliable information on their 
implication in the default process. 
Last, collecting information on the distressed company is likely to follow a sequential process. 
At the early  stages of default, it is likely the bank only has information on the profitability 
(through the ratings). On the contrary, discovering faulty management takes additional time and 
deep audit of the company. Thus, if we consider the default management as a sequential process, 
information gathering follows a double step dynamics: first, the bank, owning information on 
profitability, decides to attempt a renegotiation or to opt directly for bankruptcy. Second, in case 
of  a renegotiation attempt, the bank receives additional information on the reliability  of the 
managers (owing to the meetings that take place in the recovery units, and to the audits engaged 
by them). If the managers appear to be faulty, the chances to reach an agreement are lower (how 
to internalize bankruptcy costs in that condition?), and finally going to bankruptcy is preferable   13
(especially given the fact that the court may sanction faulty managers, leading to additional 
recoveries for the bank). 
 
2.3. Hypothesis H3: financial involvement 
 
Ceteris  paribus, a bank has stronger incentives to  privately renegotiate when  its  financial 
involvement in the debtor’s financing is higher. Indeed, when the financial stakes are huge, it is 
unlikely that the bank accepts to share the fate of the debtor’s patrimony with other rival creditors 
(this is even more likely to happen when the decision to liquidate lies in the hands of the court, as 
is the common trend in France). Financial involvement mainly depends on three  basic 
characteristics: (1) the length of the financial relationship, (2) the maximum authorized amount 
(i.e. the maximum amount that can be contractually borrowed by the debtor), and (3) the level of 
collateralization. 
Let us consider first the length of the credit relationship: the longer the bank is involved in a 
commercial relationship with the debtor, the more informed a bank is supposed to be (see above, 
hypothesis H2).  Ceteris  paribus, t he access of adequate information eases the process of 
renegotiation:  The need to trigger bankruptcy is significantly reduced thereby avoiding the 
additional costs associated with discovering information. This was aptly pointed out by Webb 
(1987) who highlights the fact that bankruptcy costs are essentially revelation costs. In addition, 
trust and reputation amongst the involved parties is often strengthened over the period of time 
thereby resulting in a lasting financial relationship.  Triggering bankruptcy may destroy such 
accumulated value, due to a loss of reputation and/or of bilateral trust. 
Let us consider now the maximum authorized amount and the degree of collateralization. Both 
are related to the “expected loss” (EL
7), as it is defined by the Basel 2 agreement (pillar 1). The 
maximum authorized amount is related to the “exposure at default” (i.e. the due amounts when 
the default occurs). The expected recovery rate (or, equivalently, one minus the “loss given 
default” (LGD)) depends on the level of collateralization. 
First, a bank is not expected to behave in a similar manner for all the due amounts. If the amount 
is high, the bank has strong incentives to invest time and money to know more about the debtor: 
it may chose renegotiation as this is a more convenient way to adapt the default resolution to the 
                                                    
7 According the 1
st pillar of the Basel 2 agreement, the expected loss is the combined product of three elements: 
probability of default, exposure at default, and loss given default.   14
specificities of the debtor. Contrastingly, if the amounts are low, why should one waste time and 
energy in implementing the process of renegotiation? It is probably easier and more profitable to 
delegate this work to a bankruptcy practitioner. From this perspective, bankruptcy procedures are 
considered to be a standard way of resolving default irrespective of the size of the company. 
Whereas, private renegotiations are more feasible incase of big and complex companies. This is 
confirmed by the European statistics showing that the bulk of bankrupt firms are SMEs (Armour, 
Hsu and Walters (2006), Blazy and Chopard (2010)). 
Second, one can hardly predict the impact of collaterals on the arbitration between renegotiation 
and bankruptcy.  Certainly, t he use of collaterals has multiple justifications:  (1) increase  of 
recoveries, (2) reduction of moral hazard (via a better control of the debtor’s assets), and (3) 
resolution of adverse-selection (via a screening of safe and risky borrowers: see Bester (1985)). 
These three justifications have veritably an impact on recoveries… B ut do they  significantly 
influence on the way of resolving default? This may be possible, but not certain. Above all, the 
impact of these three effects of collateral is hard to predict, as their effects can be direct or 
indirect. On the one hand, the owned collaterals have a direct influence on the bank’s decision to 
trigger bankruptcy, as their recovery power depends on the absolute priority order prevailing 
under bankruptcy. For instance, Davydenko and Franks (2008) have shown that secured claims 
are not well protected under the French legislation, which is more in favor of social claims. On 
the other hand, the owned collaterals have an indirect influence on the way of resolving default: 
they may provide additional information on the quality of the borrower (cf. adverse selection 
issue) and/or change  the  debtor’s strategies before  the default (cf. moral hazard issue). The 
combination of all these (direct and indirect) effects certainly influences the decision to trigger 
(or not) bankruptcy, but it is nearly impossible to predict in which direction. 
To sum up, following hypothesis H3, one can expect a higher probability of renegotiation (or at 
least an attempt to renegotiate) when the financial relation is older, and when the lending is 
higher.  On the contrary, the global impact of the collaterals is hard to predict, as it mainly 
depends on the priority order that prevails under bankruptcy (see below: hypothesis H4). 
 
2.4. Hypothesis H4: protection of the secured claims and liquidation bias 
 
Financial distress generally implies that all the creditors cannot be repaid in full. Among them, 
the secured creditors are those who are likely to have the highest bias in favor of liquidation.   15
Several theoretical and empirical works pointed out this bias. Blazy and Chopard (2010) identify 
the circumstances under which the secured creditors prefer liquidation over reorgnization: such 
circumstances depend on (1) the level of collateralization, (2) the absolute priority rule, (3) the 
structure of capital, and (4) the  beliefs about the firm’s reorganization value. Other recent 
empirical works confirm the likelihood of reorganizing the debtor is negatively correlated with 
the level of creditors’ seniority  (Ayotte and Morrison (2009), Bergström, Eisenberg,  and 
Sundgren ( 2002)). As a consequence, secured creditors  may  reduce the collective effort to 
maintain distressed firms' operations (Frouté  (2007)).  Considering a secured bank having a 
preference for liquidation, the design of bankruptcy law is  thus  expected to influence  its 
inclination to privately renegotiate in order to avoid the procedure. In such  context,  the 
orientation of the legislation is determinant:  if the bankruptcy code favors  (directly or not) 
liquidation more than continuation (as in Germany
8), the secured bank may have more incentives 
to trigger bankruptcy. This is more likely to happen when the absolute priority order (APO) 
adequately protects the senior claims
9. While, other bankruptcy codes allow for deviations from 
the APO (for example,  under the French legislation,  the recent  unpaid wages  have  a higher 
position than the secured  claims under bankruptcy).  From the bank’s point of view, such 
deviations may reduce the attractiveness of bankruptcy procedures. 
 
To sum up, hypothesis H4 predicts the level of collateralization should increase the probability of 
bankruptcy, provided (1) the bank prefers liquidation and the law facilitates such liquidation, 
(2) the renegotiation process cannot fully replicate the legal absolute priority order (APO), (3) the 
bankruptcy procedure does not decrease the bank’s priority over junior claims (i.e. there are not 
deviations from the APO). Under the French legislation (before and after 2005), these conditions 
are partially invalidated: first, the law explicitly prioritizes continuation over liquidation, and 
second, the social claims
10 outrank the secured ones. 
                                                    
8 The German 1999 reform has introduced the possibility to elaborate a continuation plan (Insolvenzplan) allowing 
for partial debt forgiveness and violation(s) from the absolute priority rule. Yet, continuation, despite being one of 
the main objectives of this reform, remains a rare option (continuation plans account for less than 1% of bankruptcy 
files, which is significantly lower than in France). 
9 As pointed out by Haugen and Senbet (1978) and (1988), such protection may be internalized through 
renegotiation… Unless the renegotiation process gets complicated by other factors (asymmetries of information, 
heterogeneous beliefs, etc.). 
10 In France, the recent unpaid wages (less than two months) benefit from a “super-privilege”.   16
Section 3. Sample, data, and descriptive statistics 
 
Data come from  five  major French commercial banks, and were hand-collected from their 
recovery units (located in Paris, Nanterre, Reims, and Marseilles). Our sample gathers 735 credit 
lines allocated to 386 French distressed firms (excluding agricultural and financial companies). 
After we dropped observations with missing or incoherent data, we respectively keep 282 and 
233 distressed companies for the descriptive statistics and for the econometrics. The concerned 
debtors have a  debt exposure  superior to 100 thousand euros.  We thus  focus on SMEs but 
exclude micro borrowers. The default year lies between 1993 and 2003 while the loans were 
granted from 1984 to 2001. The sample comes from a larger database we built between 2004 and 
2005 under the supervision of Standard & Poor’s Risk Solution. The event of “default” follows 
the Basel II criteria: a firm defaults as soon as the delays on its financial commitments exceed 90 
days. The list of all variables is described in Appendix A1: they cover (1) the profile of the 
company (age, sector, group, legal form, size – number of employees, turnover, and total of 
assets), (2) the origin of the default (with a specific focus on faulty management), (3) the nature 
of  the credit relationship (length, creditors’ concentration, rating) (4) the type of borrowings 
(each credit line is aggregated for every debtor: collateralization
11, duration, maximum authorized 
amount, recovery rate). 
 
Table 1 provides averages and frequencies computed on our dataset. Three paths are identified. 
Each corresponds to the three possible  ways of resolving the default: (1) direct bankruptcy, 
(2) failed renegotiation leading to bankruptcy, and (3) successful renegotiation leading to private 
agreement. The turnover and the loan size are in thousand of euros. The length of the banking 
relationship is in years. The other variables are in percentage. 
 
                                                    
11  We classify collaterals into six types. Two types are outside collaterals: guarantees from individuals, and 
guarantees from companies. The four other types are inside collaterals: mortgage, long-term assets other than 
mortgage, short-term assets, and other kinds of collateral.   17
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44% / 30% 48% / 51% 78% / 86%
101% 108% 172%
 
Note: The table shows the average values (or the medians, when specified). The figures in 
parenthesis are the number of missing observations, depending on the considered variable. 
 
Several  descriptive statistics  are of interest.  We first consider the  variables  on  the firm’s 
characteristics. 
The bulk of the distressed debtors are private limited companies (more than 78%), which is 
slightly higher than the national figures on bankruptcies. It is essential to stress that national 
statistics are available on bankrupt companies only, while bankruptcy is a narrower concept than 
default (indeed, the “default” covers bankruptcy  – direct or not – and private renegotiation). 
According to the national statistics issued by BODACC in 2009
12, 68% of the French bankrupt 
firms benefit from limited liability (mainly: “sociétés anonymes”, “sociétés à risqué limité”). In 
our sample (default companies), the highest proportion of LTD companies is found within direct 
bankruptcies (92%). This may reflect (directly or not) that the shareholders who benefit from 
limited liability have  incentives to t ake more risks  than the others,  so that the chances to 
                                                    
12 Bulletin National des Annonces Civiles et Commerciales: http://www.bodacc.fr/    18
renegotiate are finally lower. The French national statistics on corporate bankruptcies show a 
repartition by sectors of 22% for the commerce, 47% for the industry and 30% for the services. 
Turning to  our sample, and considering default instead of bankruptcy, these proportions lie 
between 26% to 36% (commerce), 19% to 31% (industry), and 30% to 56% (services). 
We  additionally  consider the age  of the company  and the length of the credit relationship. 
Interestingly enough, we do not find big differences between the three ways of resolving the 
default. The average age lies between 15 and 17 years, which is roughly twice the average length 
of the credit relationship (around 7 years). Hence, the banks in our sample have been supporting 
the debtor’s activity for half of the life span. Symmetrically, this result suggests these banks have 
started lending to companies that were not start ups as their average age was found to be 7. There 
are two main explanations for this. First, the age is related to the loan size. As explained before, 
we consider the firms having more than 100 thousand euros of loans, as we wish to exclude 
micro-lending from the analysis. Second, in France, the start-ups of less than 2 or 5 years are 
mainly financed by specialized financiers rather than traditional bankers. Precisely, a significant 
part of the French start-ups are financed by a public financial institution named OSEO
13 and/or 
benefit from tax shields during their first years of existence. 
We finally consider the size of the companies
14. The sample respectively shows medians
15 lying 
between 11 and 27 (employees), 1 517 € and 3 118 € (turnover), and 1 856 € and 2 448 € (total of 
assets). The smallest values are observed on the  outcomes that lead to bankruptcy ( “failed 
renegotiations” and “direct bankruptcy”)
16. 
 
Second, we consider the variables on the default resolution. 
Half of the population (whatever the outcome) has one  single bank, as  the  main source of 
financing. This partially reflects the bank-oriented French market system, where the SMEs have 
imperfect access to the financial markets, and where the banking sector is quite concentrated. 
We also consider “faulty management”. Identifying such variable requires to use the internal 
reports that are stored in the banks’ recovery units. Most of the time, these reports contain a 
                                                    
13 The OSEO’s website is: http://www.oseo.fr/  
14 Note that fewer observations have available data on their size. 
15 Our sample contains two bigger companies on the outcome “successful renegotiation”, so that the averages are 
slightly higher than the medians. Yet, the econometrics is unchanged with or without these two observations. 
16 The smaller the firm is, the lower the associated costs are. Indeed, in France, the bankruptcy costs are given by a 
legal formula that explicitly links the size of the debtor and the practitioners’ fees.   19
literal description of the origin(s) of the default. We classify this information into 49 codes. This 
allows a systematic identification of the defaults attributable to faulty management. Namely, we 
classify t hese  cases into six codes: “ asset substitution”,  “voluntary excessive risk taking”, 
“private abuse of the company’s assets”, “tricky behavior and swindle”, “accounts falsification”, 
and “financial fraud”. The complete list of our codes is displayed in Appendix A.2. Table 1 
shows the cases of “faulty management” appears in different frequencies: 13% for successful 
renegotiations, 20% for direct bankruptcies, and 27% for failed renegotiations. At this stage of 
the analysis, we have to be very cautious, as we are analyzing one-dimensional statistics only 
(multivariate econometrics is more reliable as it takes into account combined effects and control 
variables). Nevertheless, these first results suggest faulty management may be an obstacle to 
renegotiation as the aborted renegotiations show a higher percentage of faulty managers
17. 
Renegotiation and/or bankruptcy are both time-consuming processes:  interestingly, it exactly 
takes the same duration
18 to implement a bankruptcy procedure than to successfully renegotiate 
(one year). In fact, only the failed renegotiation attempts (finally leading to bankruptcy) take 
more time (twice more on average). If we consider the time spent on resolving the default as an 
indirect cost (Wruck (1990)), this result suggests the arbitration between formal bankruptcy and 
private renegotiation  is equivalent in terms of  consumed  time,  whereas the most expensive 
outcome is the failure of renegotiation. In other terms, the bank may privately renegotiate or go 
to court, but it has to be sure that its choice leads to a successful outcome. 
 
Third, we consider the variables on the debtor’s financial situation. 
Whatever the considered indicators (average or mean) the highest authorized amounts and the 
long term debt contracts concentrate onto successful renegotiations. This may suggest a positive 
correlation between the financial stakes and the probability to renegotiate, and even more to 
successfully renegotiate. This finding must me explored further via econometric modeling (see 
                                                    
17 Even if we need econometrics to provide more definitive answers, this may reflect the bank’s beliefs are updated 
during the renegotiation process: first, the bank may try to renegotiate before discovering any faulty management 
(such discovery needs additional time).  Second, once the bank discovers  the management i s faulty,  it aborts 
renegotiation and turns to the legal output (bankruptcy) as there is no trustful person to renegotiate with. 
18 The considered duration covers the period from the date of entry into the recovery unit until the date when a 
definitive solution is found (private agreement or liquidation / sale / reorganization under bankruptcy). Consequently, 
it  does not include the extra  time  that is  needed to definitively close the file (i.e. when all the proceeds are 
recovered).   20
infra). If such a positive relation is confirmed (hypothesis H3), we are allowed to say the 
arbitration between the private and the court solutions is not independent from scale effects. 
For illustration purpose, Table 1 provides additional information on the bank recovery rates
19 for 
each possible outcome. Whatever the considered indicator (mean or median), they are higher on 
successful renegotiations (close to 80%) than on the other outcomes (less than 50%). This result 
is confirmed when looking at the estimated density functions (see appendix A4): the individual 
recovery rates are closer to one for successful renegotiations than for the other outcomes. Several 
works have focused on the determinants of such bank recovery rates. Yet, these complementary 
studies go beyond the main purpose of the current research
20. Nevertheless, let us propose two 
elements of answers explaining why the private solution  should lead to higher recoveries: 
(1) some companies are illiquid only at the time of default, or even more not in financial distress 
(in the legal sense
21), so that they are not eligible for formal bankruptcy. Thus, it is not surprising 
to find higher recoveries on  successful renegotiations. (2) The  private solution may avoid 
bankruptcy costs: the resulting recoveries should be higher, even if he expected bankruptcy costs 
may be internalized and captured by the debtor  during the renegotiation process (see Blazy, 
Umbhauer, and Weill (2008)). 
Last, we find higher collateralization rates
22 on direct bankruptcies than on the other outcomes. 
This may suggest the bank turns more easily to bankruptcy when it feels more secured. Yet, to be 
acceptable, we have to control for other variables that may influence the arbitration. Indeed the 
process of arbitration  also  depends on  (1) how well secured the other  creditors  are, (2) the 
deviations from the absolute priority order that prevail under bankruptcy, (3) the probability the 
company is liquidated or reorganized at the end of the bankruptcy procedure. In the next section, 
we shall see that there is no clear evidence of a significant relation between collateralization and 
the way default is resolved. 
                                                    
19 The recovery rate is built using both actual recovered amounts and discounted expected amounts: the discount rate 
varies with the maturity and date of lending. Expectations use probabilities of recovery which take into account 
qualitative information (written remarks from the recovery unit regarding the client) and the nature of the assets 
pledged as collaterals. 
20 The Dadydenko and Franks’ paper (2008) uses the same data as ours on France, and compare them with data on 
the U.K. and on Germany. Their study suggests the French banks require more collateral when they lend credit. In 
addition, they may rely on special collateral forms which minimize the risk of dilution during the court-administered 
bankruptcy procedure. 
21 See in France, the criteria of “cessation des paiements”. 
22 The collateralization rate equals the value of the collaterals out of the exposure at default.   21
Section 4. Modeling the arbitration: econometric results 
 
Several researchers have studied the determinants of the resolution of financial distress. Two 
such recent studies were conducted in United Kingdom (Franks and Sussman ( 2005)) and 
Germany (Jostarndt and Sautner ( 2010)). These studies covered the two most important legal 
systems prevailing in Europe: the Common Law and the German Civil Law. Unfortunately, until 
now, no study has been done on the French Civil Law that has already inspired other important 
legal systems in continental Europe (Belgium, Luxembourg…).  This leaves us with an 
incomplete view of the process of default resolution in Europe. 
 
For the U.K., Franks and Sussman (2008) study a sample of 542 distressed SMEs. They analyze 
the links between the debtor’s financial structure and the way of resolving default. They show the 
liquidation rights are largely concentrated in the hands of the main banks, which give them a 
dominant position in liquidating or restructuring their debtors. One of the likely effects is the 
banks may become lazy as they relies too much on the value of their collaterals. Overall, their 
study does not find any evidence of coordination failures and/or creditors’ runs. A similar study 
was interestingly completed by Jostarndt and Sautner (2010) who conducted a similar research on 
a set of 116 listed German companies. The authors find about half of their sample succeed in 
restructuring  the  debt  contracts  while the others file for bankruptcy
23.  Overall, their r esults 
suggest the probability of reaching a private agreement is  greater  for (1) highly leveraged 
companies and for (2) companies exhibiting higher going concern value. At the opposite, formal 
bankruptcy is more likely to occur for those cases which exhibit a lack of lenders coordination 
and/or high fraction of collateralized debts. 
 
Both studies are of high interest as they rely on unique datasets which have no equivalent in 
Europe. Frank and Sussman’s data has an advantage as it covers the whole default resolution 
process from its beginning to its end. More specifically, once the default firm enters the bank’s 
“Business Support Unit”, three possible outcomes are described: (1) the firm is successfully 
rescued (so that the firm returns to branch), (2) the firm is transferred to the “Debt Recovery 
                                                    
23 In this study, we may suspect a sample bias as it focuses on the German distressed companies for which the assets’ 
value is high enough to cover the expected bankruptcy costs, so that a formal bankruptcy procedure can be triggered 
(the sample on bankruptcy is restricted to “opened files” only).   22
Unit” (where formal bankruptcy procedure starts), (3) the firm repays the loan and “re-banks” 
with another lender. The authors run a PROBIT regression to model the probability of triggering 
bankruptcy (outcome (1)) vs. the probability of escaping bankruptcy (outcomes (2) and (3)). The 
Jostarndt and Sautner’s  paper  adopts a similar approach:  they focus on companies having 
earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) inferior to the interest charges for more than two 
consecutive years.  Using  a PROBIT regression, they model the probability  of  reaching a 




Yet, despites their valuable contribution to the literature, one may raise some concerns about the 
methodology of both approaches that use simple PROBIT (or, equivalently, LOGIT) to model the 
different outcomes of default ( in a short:  workout against bankruptcy).  By doing this,  they 
implicitly postulate such outcomes stem from static choices, in the sense they do not follow any 
dynamic process. In real, most of the attempts to reach an agreement are sequential: in a first 
step, the creditor and/or the debtor arbitrate between going directly to bankruptcy and trying to 
renegotiate. In a second step, based upon the fact that renegotiation was explored first, the parties 
may fail in finding an agreement (so that bankruptcy cannot be avoided) or may succeed (so that 
a private agreement is reached). The two methodologies are illustrated in figure 1 that considers 
three possible outcomes: (1) direct bankruptcy, (2) failed renegotiation leading to bankruptcy, 
and (3) private agreement. Figure 1a illustrates the simple multinomial LOGIT approach where 
the choice between the three rival outcomes is made within a one-step process. Figure 1b shows 
how the decision process is changed within the framework of a sequential LOGIT model: here, 
this process consists of two transitional steps, so that a separate LOGIT regression is run for each 
decision. These decisions are called  “transitions”. As quoted by Buis (2007) (2008), this 
approach is known under several names: “continuation ratio LOGIT” (Agresti (2002)), “model 
for nested dichotomies” (Fox (1997)),  “sequential response model” (Maddala (1983)),  or 
“sequential LOGIT model” (Tutz (1991)). In such models, the first transition consists of an 
                                                    
24 As pointed out by the authors: “The exogeneity assumption can be justified by the actual process of a debt-
restructuring: firms choose a certain debt structure first and then, upon a default, renegotiate the pre-determined 
terms. However, borrowing arrangements could also be determined endogenously ex ante by claimants' expectations 
about a firm's restructuring prospects in case of a future default. In this case, the coefficients in the above regressions 
would provide us with correlations but do not allow for a causal interpretation of the link between the borrowing 
characteristics and the workout probability of a firm” (quoted from Jostarndt and Sautner (2010)).   23
alternative between “direct bankruptcy” and “renegotiation attempt”. The second transition 
consists of an alternative between “failed renegotiation” (hence, bankruptcy) and “successful 
renegotiation” (hence,  private  agreement) for those cases that have selected  the alternative 
“renegotiation attempt” during the first transition. 
 
Figures 1a and 1b. Three ways of resolving default 
 












In our view, it might be misleading to consider the arbitration between renegotiation and 
bankruptcy as a static choice. On the contrary, our data on France clearly distinguish between 
direct bankruptcies, failed renegotiations leading to bankruptcy, and successful agreements. This 
allows us to account for the accumulation of information over time. Precisely, the probability of 
reaching an agreement is conditional to the fact that bankruptcy was not decided first, so that the 
stakeholders tried to explore the private solution. In other words, the understanding of the default 
process requires to split between (1) the variables that explain the decision to engage (or not) 
renegotiation and (2) the variables that explain the success (or the failure) of renegotiation. 
 
Our explanatory variables are split between the test variables and the control variables. The test 
variables  aim at checking the validity of assumptions H1 to H4. Appendix A3 provides the 
correlation matrix on our variables. 
 
We first consider the dummy variable  named  “Bank i s the Company’s main creditor”.  The 
variable is related to hypothesis H1 as it reflects the creditors’ dispersion. When it equals one, the 
debtor’s main (and/or exclusive) sources of financing rely in the hands of one single bank (the 
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(and/or other trade creditors), but these other financing opportunities are marginal compared to 
the main one. 
 
Second, we consider hypothesis H2 that states the collection of information is sequential: at the 
early stage of the default, the bank owns information on profitability only, whereas discovering 
faulty management takes more time. To account for both effects, we consider four variables. The 
first one is related to “faulty management”, which was identified by the bank’s recovery unit (cf. 
supra). Following the literature on moral hazard, faulty management includes underinvestment, 
asset substitution and weak managerial efforts. Since such managerial behaviors are sanctioned 
by the French bankruptcy code
25, we consider them as moral hazard cases. The second variable 
(“bad rating at default time”) and the third variable (“length of the banking relationship”
26) deal 
with the bank’s information about the debtor’s profitability. On the one side, the rating (either 
good or bad) accounts for the debtor’s individual risk as it is assessed by the bank. On the other 
side, the length of the banking relationship is commonly considered as a good proxy of the bank’s 
individual information. The fourth variable multiplies two effects: the (faulty) management and 
the (bad) rating. When the combined variable equals one, the bank has two complementary pieces 
of information that predict an agreement is hardly reachable: first, the debtor’s management is 
faulty and second, the debtor’s individual risk is high. 
 
Third, we consider a set of variables that account for  the bank’s  financial involvement  (see 
hypothesis H3).  The first variable  is the  maximum  authorized amounts: it is the maximum 
amount of money that can be borrowed by the debtor. Such limit is contractually defined at the 
beginning of the credit relation. The second variable is the “percentage of long term credit lines”: 
the longer the debt contract is, the higher is the bank’s financial involvement, as it is engaged in a 
more lasting relation with the debtor. 
 
Fourth,  we consider hypothesis H4 that focuses on  the level of c ollateralization. We have 
information on the type and the amount of collaterals that were granted to the bank during the 
                                                    
25 Since 1985 (Code n°85-98, 25
th of January 1985, Title V, Art. 180 to 182), the French courts may punish managers 
if the administrator’s report reveals faulty management. The “fault” covers asset substitution, tricky behavior, and, 
more generally, any action that might have worsened the financial situation of the firm. Sanctions are either criminal 
and/or pecuniary. The latter makes the manager pay for the firm’s debt using his own personal wealth. 
26 The variable equals the logarithm of the duration (in years) of the banking relationship.   25
credit relation, before the debtor defaults. We split between inside and outside collaterals. Inside 
collaterals cover the securities whose value relies on the debtor’s own assets. We isolate four 
types of internal collaterals: (1) mortgage, (2) long-term assets other than mortgage, (3) short-
term assets, and (4) other inside collaterals. Outside collaterals extend the bank’s priority to other 
patrimonies. These are of two types: (1) guarantees from individuals, and (2) guarantees from 
companies. 
 
Last, we control for other variables that may impact on the post-default arbitration. More 
precisely, we consider (1) the legal form of the debtor (“limited liability”), (2) the sector of 
activity (commerce, industry, relatively to the services), (3) the economic organization (“does the 
company belongs to a group”
27), and (4) the macroeconomic context (the GDP growth 
corresponding to the year of default). 
 
Table 2: The determinants of the arbitration between renegotiation and bankruptcy 
Estimation Prob. > c² Estimation Prob. > c² Estimation Prob. > |z| Estimation Prob. > |z|
Constant -3.2410** 0.016 -5.9475*** <.0001 -2.2137** 0.049 1.4809 0.422
Origin of default: faulty management -0.0795 0.800 0.1363 0.639 0.0531 0.91 0.7472 0.361
Faulty management  x  Bad rating at default time 0.6671 0.164 -0.5536 0.396 0.4569 0.571 -2.8897* 0.072
ln (length of the banking relationship, in years ) 0.1595 0.550 0.2338 0.383 0.2097 0.317 0.4005 0.306
Bank is the company's main creditor -0.0387 0.854 -0.5180** 0.014 -0.5417* 0.094 -1.5516** 0.013
Bad rating at default time -0.1251 0.582 0.1397 0.516 0.0325 0.925 0.4307 0.471
ln ( authorized amount, K€ ) 0.2806 0.170 0.4946** 0.016 0.3751** 0.022 0.0603 0.793
% of long term credit lines (due amounts, K€) 0.5140 0.255 0.9828** 0.029 0.7477** 0.034 0.0119 0.986
ln (internal collaterals, K€) 0.0270 0.708 -0.0479 0.495 -0.0089 0.872 -0.0802 0.394
ln (external collaterals, K€) 0.0068 0.922 0.0167 0.807 0.0085 0.875 -0.0246 0.796
Limited liability -0.1157 0.704 -0.4492* 0.088 -0.5956 0.186 -1.1625 0.125
The company belongs to a group -0.2553 0.209 -0.4358** 0.035 -0.7001** 0.029 -0.5656 0.315
Commerce -0.0658 0.779 -0.4248* 0.078 -0.5134 0.169 -1.3376* 0.056
Industry -0.3008 0.246 -0.6243** 0.016 -0.9381** 0.019 -0.8632 0.236
GDP growth -1.2791 0.928 22.9320 0.133 10.2872 0.368 23.8933 0.232
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MODEL I: Simple Logit
-210.16
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MODEL II: Sequential Logit
 
 
                                                    
27 In France, the bankruptcy procedure can be extended to other companies if, first, they belong to the same group of 
the debtor, and second, the respective patrimonies are mingled together.   26
Table 2 shows the results of two regression models explaining the three ways of resolving the 
default. Model I is simple multinomial LOGIT model: the explained variable is the probability 
that renegotiation either fails (model I, column 1) or succeeds (model I, column 2), against the 
reference alternative (direct bankruptcy). Model II is a sequential LOGIT model. In model II, the 
first column contains the estimates for the first step of the arbitration: i.e. how the explanatory 
variables impact on the probability of a renegotiation attempt against direct bankruptcy. The 
second column (model II) contains the estimates for the second step of the arbitration: i.e. how 
the explanatory variables impact on the probability of a successful renegotiation, given that direct 
bankruptcy was not chosen at first. 
 
The simple LOGIT approach shows few significant variables. Consequently, the Wald test rejects 
the global significance of the model (the p-value is just above 10%). The Score test is significant 
(below 3%) but it is less strict than the Wald test. The first column does not show significant 
variables but the intercept, so that we cannot identify any variables explaining the occurrence of 
failed renegotiation attempts.  Turning to column two, several variables explain successful 
renegotiations, but most of them are control variables (limited liability, group membership, and 
sector). Regarding the test variables, three of them are significant. First, the two variables 
accounting for hypothesis H3 (financial involvement) are significant at the 5% level: the 
authorized amount (in log) and the part of the long term credits (in percent) both increase the 
probability of a successful renegotiation. Can we conclude  that  the chances of avoiding 
bankruptcy (directly or not) depend on the bank’s financial involvement? Certainly not: such 
result may be an artifact as the failed and successful renegotiations are considered as simple 
alternative to direct bankruptcy. In fact, the probability that renegotiation succeeds is conditional 
to the fact that bankruptcy was avoided at first. In our view, following hypothesis H2, it is more 
likely the bank attempts to renegotiate when the financial stakes are high, but we expect neither 
the authorized amounts nor the long term credits to influence the chances of success. The last 
significant test variable is the proxy of bank concentration (see hypothesis H1). The estimated 
sign is negative, so that a private agreement has less chance to be reached when the bank is the 
main creditor. This last result suggests that the “bargaining power counterargument” described in 
H1 overcompensates the “coordination argument”. This result is in accordance with the findings 
of Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2009), but needs confirmation. We turn now to the sequential   27
LOGIT (columns 3 and 4) to check if this result is still valid when default resolution is modeled 
as a dynamic process. 
 
The sequential LOGIT estimates are shown in columns 3 (step 1: renegotiation attempt vs. direct 
bankruptcy) and  in  column 4 ( step 2:  successful  renegotiation  vs. failed  attempt leading to 
bankruptcy). As for the simple L.OGIT approach, the control variables accounting for the sector 
and for the group structure  influence  the post-default arbitration. Turning  over  to the test 
variables, our estimates provide useful evidences to check hypotheses H1 to H4. 
 
Regarding hypothesis H1, as for the simple LOGIT approach, the dummy variable accounting for 
bank concentration  is always significant and negative: when the bank is the debtor’s main 
creditor, there is less chance that both parts explore the private solution and that such attempt 
succeeds. This result suggests the “coordination argument” is of secondary importance compared 
to the “bargaining power counterargument”. According to the latter, whatever the coordination 
issues, a major bank may not  wish to renegotiate because (1) the  competition with the other 
minor creditors is expected to be weak under bankruptcy, and/or because (2) the debtor cannot 
survive without the main bank’s financial support, so that the bankruptcy’s output is likely to be 
the one desired by the bank. Consequently, even a court-administered procedure (as in France) 
may not have dissuasive effects provided the bank’s bargaining power is strong enough. On the 
contrary, such procedure may attract the bank (or, symmetrically discourage the firm) whenever 
nothing can be renegotiated or reorganized without its support. This is all the more likely to 
happen in a country where substitutes to credit financing are scarce (in France the SMEs have 
limited access to the capital markets and rely more on intermediated financing). This first result 
appears relatively strong as it is confirmed whatever the way of modeling the arbitration (simple 
and sequential LOGIT models). In the contrasting situation (i.e. when the bank is not the firm’s 
main  creditor),  a balanced  pool of creditors may have  strong  incentives to overcome the 
coordination issue, and consequently to agree together, as they may fear losing their decision 
making power in a procedure where the final decision powers lie in the hands of the court. 
 
According to hypothesis H2,  renegotiation is reachable provided the bank has information on 
(1) the project’s profitability (adverse selection issue: H2a), and on (2) the managers’ reliability 
(moral hazard issue: H2b). The bank’s internal rating is a proxy of the first issue (see dummy   28
variable “bad rating at default time”). The information on faulty management is a proxy of the 
second issue (see dummy variable “origin of default: faulty management”).  The sequential 
LOGIT does not show any direct effect on the way of resolving default. Yet, when we consider 
the combined effect of both sources of information, we find a negative (-2.89) and significant 
(7% level) impact of variable “faulty management · bad rating” on the arbitration taking place in 
step 2. Thus, when the bank knows that (1) the project’s rating is bad, and (2) the managers are 
faulty, the chances of  signing  a private agreement are reduced. This result is all the more 
validated when one recalls that the information gathering process can be viewed as sequential 
(see above: H2). At the early stage of financial distress, suppose the bank owns information on 
bad profitability (through the ratings): yet, this piece of information is insufficient to decisively 
impact on the way of resolving default. The profitability issue can overcome is the managers are 
competent, reactive, and  (above  all)  honest. Yet,  discovering  the managers’ capacity to 
restructure the firm’s project takes additional time.  Our findings suggest that if this second 
condition is missing, a private agreement has lower chances to be  executed. To sum up, 
profitability and reliability are two essential conditions to escape bankruptcy, but it needs time to 
discover them. Consequently, the first step of the arbitration (renegotiation attempt vs. direct 
bankruptcy) does not depend on these conditions. But, if bankruptcy was avoided at first, both of 
them are needed to increase the chances to successfully renegotiate. 
 
The variables accounting for the bank’s financial involvement (see hypothesis H3) play a 
significant role, but it is limited to the first step of the arbitration. The authorized amounts and the 
part of the long term credits both increase the chances of a renegotiation attempt (whatever the 
outcome of such attempt). This result differs from the simple LOGIT that  optimistically 
suggested the bank’s financial involvement was a key element for successful renegotiation. The 
sequential LOGIT moderate such result: when the amounts at stake are bigger and/or when the 
debt contracts are longer, the chance of undertaking renegotiation is higher, but this does not 
predict such renegotiation shall be successful, as we do not find any significant impact on the 
probability of successfully renegotiate. From a normative perspective, we can expect the small 
borrowers to enter bankruptcy more easily and more quickly. For the bigger ones, our results 
suggest their chances to escape bankruptcy mainly depend on other factors than the size and the 
term structure of the loan. Reiterating the hypotheses H1 and H2, we find that the creditors’   29
dispersion, the quality of the project, and the reliability of the management are important factors 
for success. To sum up, hypothesis H3 is partially confirmed: our results suggest the arbitration 
between the private and the court solutions is not independent from scale effects. Yet, we do not 
find any empirical evidence that these effects influence the chances of success of renegotiation 
attempts. 
 
Last, let us consider hypothesis H4 that predicts collateralization may increase the probability of 
triggering bankruptcy, provided three conditions prevail: (1) the bank prefers liquidation and the 
law facilitates such liquidation, (2) the renegotiation process cannot fully replicate the APO 
prevailing under bankruptcy, (3) there are not deviations from the APO under bankruptcy. We do 
not find any evidence of a positive or negative impact of collateralization on the way the default 
is resolved. Indeed, whatever the type of the collaterals (inside or outside ones), there is no clear 
link with the arbitration. What can we conclude? Either there is no effect at all (i.e. the arguments 
behind H4 do not even play a role compared to the others related to hypotheses H1 to H3), or the 
arguments behind H4 compensate each others. In our view, the latter seems the most convincing 
explanation. Indeed, the French legislation presents conflicting characteristics that compensate 
each others. On the one hand, the French legislation prioritizes continuation over liquidation
28, 
and grants the social claims a higher rank in the APO than the secured ones. On the other hand, 
the French procedures mostly end up into liquidation  (90% of  the cases
29), and provide a 
complete and rather sophisticated framework dedicated to the sale as a going concern (which is, 
in fine, an integrated way to liquidate the debtor’s assets). In such a context, the French banks 
have to consider the pros and the cons of the French legal framework that mix liquidation and 
continuation biases and that provides only a limited protection of their secured claims. Overall, in 
France, it not guaranteed that secured claims generate more money inside or outside bankruptcy. 
 
Section 5. Conclusion 
 
The paper investigates the determinants of the post-default arbitration between private 
reorganization and formal bankruptcy. Both ways of resolving the default are not economically 
equivalent in terms of cost, coordination, and information. By using original data on France, we 
                                                    
28 See the 1
st article of the 1994 French bankruptcy code, whose inclination to continuation was extended in 2005. 
29 See Blazy, Delannay, Petey, and Weill (2008).   30
provide useful complementary material to the previous studies. Nothing has been done until now 
on the French civil law systems. In addition, the previous researches considered the post-default 
arbitration as a static process, whereas information  sequentially accumulates over time.  By 
extracting data from the recovery units of five French banks, we are able to distinguish between, 
first, direct bankruptcies,  second,  failed renegotiations leading to bankruptcy, and  third, 
successful  renegotiations leading to private agreement.  We  split between  the variables that 
explain the decision to engage (or not) renegotiation and the variables that explain the success (or 
the failure) of renegotiation. 
We test four hypotheses (H1: renegotiation  vs. bargaining; H2: information gathering; H3: 
financial involvement; H4: collateralization). Our main results follow. Regarding H1, the 
“coordination argument” is of secondary importance compared to the “bargaining power 
counterargument”. Indeed, whatever the coordination issues, a major bank may not wish to 
renegotiate simply because the competition with the other minor creditors is expected to be weak 
under bankruptcy, and/or because the debtor cannot survive without the bank’s financial support. 
Consequently, even a court-administered procedure (as in France) may not have dissuasive 
effects provided the bank’s bargaining power is strong enough. Regarding H2, we find the project 
profitability and the managers’ reliability are two essential conditions to escape bankruptcy, but it 
needs time to discover them. Consequently, the first step of the arbitration (i.e. renegotiation 
attempt  vs. direct bankruptcy) does not depend on these conditions. But, if renegotiation is 
explored, both of them are needed to increase the chances to successfully renegotiate. 
Regarding H3, our results suggest that, when the lending is bigger and/or when the debt contract 
is longer, the chance of undertaking renegotiation is higher, but this does not predict the success 
of such renegotiation. From a normative perspective, we can expect the small borrowers to enter 
bankruptcy more easily and more quickly. For the bigger ones, our results suggest their chances 
to escape bankruptcy mainly depend on other factors than the size and the term structure of the 
loan. Last, regarding H4, we do not find any clear evidence that the level of collateralization 
significantly influence the tradeoff between informal renegotiation and formal bankruptcy. 
Numerous theoretical papers on corporate bankruptcy have provided convincing arguments to 
explain the arbitration between the private and the court solutions. Yet, empirical evidence has to 
be explored further. The next step is to study the influence of such arbitration on efficiency, and 
more specifically on the observed recovery rates.   31
Appendixes 
 
A1. Variables and codifications 
 
The following table provides the list of our explanatory variables, with the complete 
description. 
 
Name of the variable Description
Origin of default: faulty management
Equals 1 if one (or more) cause(s) of the default is related to faulty 
management (conscious acceptance of non-profitable markets, 
overinvestment, underinvestment, excessive speculation, private 
benefits, fraud)
Faulty management  x  Bad rating at default time
Equals 1 if the one (or more) cause(s) of the default is related to faulty 
management and the debtor's last known rating was bad (negative Z 
value).
ln (length of the banking relationship, in years )
log of the duration of the banking relationship, from the first lending 
date up to the date of default (in years).
Bank is the company's main creditor
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the bank is the company's main creditor 
(based on the list of all the creditors).
Bad rating at default time
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the debtor's last known rating was bad 
(negative Z value).
ln ( authorized amount, K€ )
log of the maximum amount of authorized credits (as defined in the 
debt contract).
% of long term credit lines (due amounts, K€)
Percentage of long term lending (more than 1 year) out of the total 
lending.
ln (internal collaterals, K€)
log of the amount of internal collaterals (mortgage, long-term assets 
other than mortgage, short-term assets, other inside collaterals).
ln (external collaterals, K€)
log of the amount of external collaterals (guarantees from individuals, 
guarantees from companies).
Limited liability
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the debtor benefits from limited liability 
(LTD).
The company belongs to a group Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the debtor belongs to a group.
Commerce Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the sector is 'commerce'.
Industry Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the sector is industry'.
GDP growth Increase annual rate of the GDP of the year of default.
 
 
The following table provides our codifications on the cause(s) of default. The items in bold 
are related to faulty management.   32
Outlets
[1] Brutal disappearance of customers; [2] Customer(s) in default; [3] Product(s) too expensive 
(selling price is too high); [4] Bad evaluation of the market; [5] Product(s) too cheap (selling price 
is too low); [6] Unsuitable products; [7] Obsolete products; [8] Loss of market shares (regular fall 
of the firm's demand).
Strategy
[1] Youth of the company (inexperience); [2] Voluntary dissolution of the activity;[3] Failure of 
important projects (partnerships, investments, reorganizations);[4] Voluntary acceptance of 
little profitable markets (dumping...).
Production
[1] Production capacity was too strong, overinvestment; [2] Depreciation of the assets; [3] 
Operating costs were too high (other than wages: external expenses, raw materials...); [4] Wages 
expenses were too high; [5] Brutal disapearance of suppliers; [6] Unsuitable process of 
production (obsolete); [7] Underinvestment.
Finance
[1] Longer delays on accounts receivable; [2] Contagion / reported losses from subsidiaries; [3] 
Shorter delays on accounts payable; [4] Excessive speculation of the company; [5] end of the 
financial support from the head office / holding; [6] Lack of equity (compared to 
leverage/liabilities); [7] Loan refusal to the company; [8] end/reduction of the subventions to the 
company; [9] Contractual interest rates are too high.
Management
[1] Weak accounts reporting / informational system is deficient; [2] Problems of 
competence; [3] Disagreements among the directors / managers; [4] Excessive takings from 
the managers; [5] Insufficient provisions; [6] Lack of knowledge on the real level of costs 
of returns (causing too weak selling); [7] Bad evaluation of inventory; [8] Problems of 
transmission of the company / difficulties in restructuring.
Accident
[1] Swindle / embezzlements affecting the company; [2] Another insolvency procedure (for 
other companies) is extended to the firm (same patrimonies); [3] Disputes with public partners 
(fiscal inquiry); [4] Disputes with private partners; [5] Death / disease / disappearance of the 
manager; [6] Disaster; [7] Social problems within the company.
External
environment
[1] Unfavorable fluctuation of the exchange rates; [2] Increase of the competition; [3] Decreasing 
demand to the sector; [4] “Force majeure” (war, natural catastrophe, industrial crisis, politics, bad 
price evolution); [5] Public policy less favorable to the sector; [6] Period of credit crunch; [7] The 
general level of interest rates is too high; [8] Macroeconomic increase of operating costs (raw 
materials, GMW…).




A2. The French bankruptcy law 
 
Since the bankruptcy law reforms of 01/25/1985 and 06/10/1994, the French collective system 
involves two complementary court administered procedures. The first aims at continuing 
business, either through a reorganization plan or a sale as a going concern (“redressement 
judiciaire”). The second is a standard liquidation procedure of a firm’s assets (“liquidation 
judiciaire”)
30. The French law was recently reformed in 2006 and 2008: among other changes, an 
additional procedure (“procédure de sauvegarde”) was added to solve the first difficulties of 
companies that are not in default yet. 
                                                    
30 In the shadow of the process, there also exists an out-of-court settlement (“règlement amiable” or “conciliation”): 
the manager, with the help of an officer, negotiates with some of the creditors the payment of outstanding debts.   33
 

























At triggering, the court checks whether the debtor is financially distressed, and examines the pre-
default contracts which appear irregular, in the sense that they might have voluntarily caused a 
reduction of the firm’s value prior to bankruptcy (this covers the so-called “période suspecte”). 
Then, the debtor’s chances of recovery are assessed during an observation period (“période 
d’observation”) that may last up to 20 months. The new claims arising after the triggering date 
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Other ways of triggering: 
- Non-fulfillment of financial com- 
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Trigerring by: 
- Professional Judge 
continuation
Reorganization Sale  34
regarding some secured claims, in case of liquidation). During the observation period, a legal 
administrator is appointed by the court: it may help or replace the managers, depending on their 
ability to run the firm. The administrator engages several measures (firing, wages modifications, 
investments…) that may help to firm to recover. Each measure must be approved by the court. At 
the same time, the administrator audits the debtor, and finally proposes a solution to the court 
(continuation, through a reorganization plan or a sale, or liquidation). The commercial court 
holds the authority to choose between possible outcomes and in the process may or may not 
follow administrator’s recommendation. 
 
The 1994 legislation is very similar to the previous 1985 code. The main innovations in 1994 are: 
(1) a change in the absolute priority rule in case of liquidation (secured claims are now paid 
before new money claims), (2) the court may sue agents who buy bankrupt firms in order to sell 
them piecemeal once bankruptcy process is closed; and (3) the court can immediately liquidate 
the debtor if the chances of recovery are null, even under the protection of the law (immediate 
liquidations used to happen before 1994 but they were not explicitly allowed by the law). These 
changes in the legislation did not crucially modify the practice of commercial courts. 
 
In January 2006, French bankruptcy law was reformed to allow for easier bankruptcy filings. 
These may now be initiated voluntarily by managers, creditors or the court, even if the financially 
distressed firm is not “ en cessation des paiements”. In the previous bankruptcy system, 
financially distressed firms had to be largely unable to pay debts before they could file for 
bankruptcy. Since 2006, all firms that face the possibility of going bankrupt in the future may 
initiate a bankruptcy filing. However, adequate data is still not available to cover on this last 
reform.   35
A3. Density functions of the bank recovery rates 
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-0.00316 0.03659 0.04115 1
0.9597 0.5585 0.5105
-0.09885 0.30078 0.21976 -0.08399 1
0.0976 <.0001 0.0002 0.1787
-0.02858 -0.06182 0.13888 -0.10422 -0.07124 1
0.6328 0.3009 0.0196 0.0948 0.233
-0.00773 -0.00209 -0.07156 0.21034 -0.08632 0.10191 1
0.9022 0.9735 0.2549 0.0012 0.1694 0.1045
-0.04582 -0.0515 0.13159 0.09611 0.06035 0.29941 0.17041 1
0.4434 0.3889 0.0271 0.1236 0.3125 <.0001 0.0064
0.02512 0.13346 0.04384 0.08123 0.10881 0.07491 0.0315 0.08627 1
0.6745 0.025 0.4633 0.1934 0.0681 0.2098 0.6166 0.1485
0.00363 0.09062 0.00285 -0.1955 0.02897 -0.08747 -0.1963 -0.12007 0.02384 1
0.9516 0.129 0.9621 0.0016 0.6281 0.1429 0.0016 0.0439 0.6902
0.0298 0.01941 0.1431 -0.12854 -0.00896 0.16116 0.06884 0.00478 -0.10883 -0.02609 1
0.6182 0.7456 0.0162 0.0391 0.8809 0.0067 0.2735 0.9363 0.068 0.6627
0.05371 0.09255 -0.0816 -0.04871 0.09795 -0.08854 -0.1248 -0.09551 0.0808 0.12497 -0.13858 1
0.3689 0.121 0.1718 0.4359 0.1007 0.138 0.0465 0.1095 0.176 0.0359 0.0199
-0.03155 0.04763 0.15642 -0.11092 0.04003 0.07329 -0.17522 0.02007 -0.08109 0.16691 0.03421 -0.45023 1
0.5978 0.4256 0.0085 0.0753 0.5031 0.2198 0.005 0.7372 0.1745 0.005 0.5673 <.0001
-0.03555 0.07046 0.08756 -0.03331 0.13791 -0.00169 -0.03358 0.05888 0.04418 -0.01038 -0.04264 -0.02012 0.10082 1
0.5522 0.2382 0.1424 0.5943 0.0205 0.9775 0.5935 0.3245 0.4599 0.8622 0.4757 0.7366 0.091 GDP growth









Origin of default: faulty 
management
Faulty management x Bad 
rating at default time
ln (length of the banking 
relationship, in years )
Bank is the company's 
main creditor
Bad rating at default time
ln(due amount,K€)
 
Note: The Table shows the Pearson correlation indexes for the variables that are considered in our regressions. The small figure that is 
displayed below each correlation index is the p-value for the null hypothesis (a p-value less than 10% means the null hypothesis can be 
rejected so that the correlation index is significantly different from zero). 
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